After a six-month hiatus, U.S. special envoy John Coale again arrived in Belarus on September 15. However, his meeting with contested leader Alexander Lukashenko was less productive than previous encounters. Minsk released substantially fewer political prisoners than expected, and the United States lifted sanctions on just two Belarusian companies. While both sides insisted all was well and Coale would return in a month, and U.S. President Donald Trump announced work on a “massive” potash deal with Belarus, there are growing doubts over the process’s long-term prospects.

 As part of the most recent exchange, Belarus released and deported twenty-five political prisoners—including prominent journalists and activists—to Lithuania. In comparison, Belarus had released over 120 in December 2025, and 250 in March 2026 (most of whom were allowed to remain in Belarus). The day Coale arrived in Minsk for the latest round of talks, sources said that as many as 200 political prisoners were being prepared for release this time (with most allowed to stay in the country), and that their relatives had already been informed.

Washington’s concessions were also underwhelming, with the United States lifting sanctions on just two Belarusian companies (chemical manufacturer Lakokraska and state-owned Bellesbumprom, which oversees companies in the timber, paper, and furniture industries). This was much less of a prize than previous decisions to lift sanctions on Belarusian potash producers, national carrier Belavia, and Belarusian banks. The barely profitable Lakokraska is unlikely to benefit much from access to the U.S. market. Meanwhile, Bellesbumprom’s main problem is the ban on exporting to or via the EU, as a result of which its products are sold via Russia. All an end to U.S. sanctions against it will do is make it easier to pay those third-party countries. 

Ahead of the negotiations, Lukashenko had demanded that the United States unfreeze around $44 million apparently held in a Citibank account because of sanctions. Coale agreed during the visit to submit a request to the bank to release the funds, but no final decision has been announced.       

Until now, successive rounds of concessions by Minsk and Washington had been increasingly substantial. Meetings ran smoothly and conformed to a straightforward script: Coale’s visit, a prisoner release and lifting of sanctions, and then behind-the-scenes negotiations prior to another visit. Some visits had been postponed, but this was the first time the plans changed while a meeting was underway. What went wrong?

Most likely, there was a sticking point in the substance of the negotiations. Lukashenko’s first words in front of the cameras were that the two sides should implement previous agreements: a rather chilly opening. For the first time, Belarusian Prime Minister Alexander Turchin was present at the Coale-Lukashenko meeting—apparently to elaborate on what hadn’t been done. 

Perhaps Lukashenko was upset about technical details that have made it difficult for Minsk to take full advantage of previous U.S. concessions. Or perhaps he was unhappy about the main, unresolved problem in these negotiations: the stance of the EU. Not only is there no desire in Brussels to lift sanctions on Belarus, it keeps imposing new ones. In the spring, Washington asked Lithuania, Poland, and Ukraine to allow Belarusian potash to be shipped to their ports—but they refused, and the matter has stalled.

A further stumbling block is that as fast as Minsk is releasing political prisoners, it is creating new ones, while Washington’s ambition is to free all Belarusian political prisoners. Even for the administration of President Donald Trump—not known for its concern about human rights—a deal in which the United States is gradually lifting sanctions while Belarus releases political prisoners at the same rate it’s jailing new ones makes little sense.

Coale has been trying to persuade Lukashenko to stop political arrests since at least the beginning of this year. However, since 250 political prisoners were released in March, another 224 names have been added to the country’s list of political prisoners. Even though hundreds have left prison in the last six months after completing their sentences, the total number of political prisoners in Belarus continues to hover at about 900.

The recent talks have demonstrated that the terrain of the negotiations is becoming increasingly boggy. The risks of delays are growing, and the process could reach a stalemate.

The United States does not want to be sold goods of which there is an inexhaustible supply in exchange for lifting a finite number of sanctions. Lukashenko, meanwhile, clearly expected the dialogue to yield more. In particular, he would have liked to see the participation of Minsk’s neighbors—because they have power over the transit of Belarusian potash. At closed-door meetings in Minsk with European experts and diplomats, Belarusian officials often seek recognition for freeing political prisoners, requesting that the releases be seen as a concession to the EU as well as to Washington.

It’s likely that the United States and Belarus will seek to make further efforts to involve other European states in the coming months. Ukraine is very unlikely to agree: Russia continues to destroy its port infrastructure, and the Kyiv-Minsk relationship remains in crisis. In mid-September, Ukrainian security officials again alleged that Belarus is allowing Russian drones on their way to attack western Ukraine to use its relay stations and mobile networks.

Minsk has been seeking a rapprochement with Poland for months. To this end, the Belarusian authorities not only released from prison Andrzej Poczobut, one of the leaders of Belarus’ Polish minority, but also allowed him to travel back to Belarus for meetings.

Lithuania, though, is likely to come under the most U.S. pressure. Although Vilnius is not happy about the Belarusian-U.S. talks, the recently elected prime minister, Mindaugas Sinkevičius, leader of the Social Democratic Party, is slightly more open to the idea of negotiations. After seeing Lukashenko, Coale met with Sinkevičius in Vilnius and, at least according to The New York Times, discussed potash transit.

Finally, there is Latvia, which formerly facilitated Belarusian potash exports. However, Riga has little incentive to be accommodating: To appease Warsaw, Belarus recently redirected migrants it had been funneling toward the Polish border to the Latvian border.

Even if Poland, Latvia, or Lithuania wanted to help Washington, existing EU sanctions make it impossible for them to allow potash exports from Belarus. However, the sanctions are due to be renewed in February 2027. If the Belarusian-U.S. dialogue has not run out of steam by then, Washington may try to look for allies in the EU to block the extension unless an exemption is made for potash.

For the moment, it’s unclear whether Minsk and Washington will be able to find a sufficiently powerful lobbyist within the EU to achieve such an outcome. Nor is it a given that there is even enough high-level political will in the United States to pressure Europe over the matter of Belarusian political prisoners.

Trump’s most recent post on his Truth Social network claiming that Minsk and Washington are discussing a “massive deal” on the sale of potash changes little in this regard. Lithuania has already said that the deal does not concern it, hinting that the United States is welcome to buy Belarusian potash, but through Russian northern ports—thereby financing both the Lukashenko regime and Russia’s war economy.

Trump also framed the possible deal with Minsk as a blow to Canada’s position as a traditional supplier of potash to the United States. That could make it even harder to secure the EU’s consent. It is one thing to help the United States achieve the humanitarian goal of freeing Belarusian political prisoners. It is another to stab Canada, a close EU ally, in the back to help Trump in his trade war with Ottawa.

The irony of the situation is that having railed at U.S. hegemony for over three decades, Lukashenko is now a victim of the weakening of that very hegemony. Washington’s loss of influence in Europe is one of the reasons he cannot get what he wants.